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A NEW PRESCRIPTION TO BALANCE SECRECY AND
DISCLOSURE IN DRUG-APPROVAL PROCESSES
Gerrit M. Beckhaus*

To obtain approval to market a drug, a manufacturer must disclose significant
amounts of research data to the government agency that oversees the approvalprocess. The data often include information that could help advance scientific progress, and are therefore of great value. But current laws in both the United States
and Europe give secrecy great weight. This Article proposes an obligatory sealed-bid
auction of the sensitive information based on the experience with similar auctions

in mergers and acquisitions, to balance manufacturers' interest in secrecy and the
public interest in disclosure.

INTRODUCTION

Protecting trade secrets and other sensitive commercial information is increasingly significant, given their immense economic
worth. In today's globalized world, once such information is disclosed to a third party, it irrevocably loses value. In the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry, in which different companies
often race to bring similar drugs to market, the knowledge of a
competitor's research data might have a particularly decisive impact
on the success of the evolving product, allowing for the development of an improved version or even an entirely new drug. Therefore, the pharmaceutical industry strives for strict secrecy in
product development.'
To market a drug for human use, a manufacturer needs the approval of a competent government agency. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determines the drug's safety and efficacy in the
U.S. market, and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) does the
same in Europe.2 Approval requires intensive trials in several specific phases.3 Approval takes years and costs a fortune. 4 It requires a
*
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Peter Lurie & Allison Zieve, Sometimes the Silence Can Be Like the Thunder: Access to
PharmaceuticalData at the FDA, 69 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 85 (2006).

2.
3.

See infra Parts I.B.I., I.C.1.
See id.

4.

See infra Part I.B.1.
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manufacturer to provide the respective agency with detailed information on the developed drug, particularly the trial and research
data. 5 Although parts of the application are publicly available, the
current legal framework and its implementation by the FDA and
6
EMA strongly protect sensitive information.
Protecting sensitive information ensures the manufacturer benefits exclusively from its research, and functions as a strong incentive
for further investments in research and development, advancing
medical science in general. However, by denying competitors and
independent scientists access to certain research data, this protection slows scientific progress, since third parties are restrained from
using this data to contribute to future innovations. Aligning these
conflicting interests implicates public health, because it would contribute to the advancement of medical science. Current proposals
to deal with this dilemma tend to lean heavily on one side or the
other. Neither approach optimizes scientific progress: one course
stifles progress, while the other compromises the incentive to invest
7
in research.
This Article suggests a new approach, advocating that policymakers take advantage of the fact that a government agency is in a position to provide valuable sensitive information to third parties to
foster scientific progress. On this basis, this Article proposes an
obligatory auction of the sensitive data-a new approach to striking
a balance between the private interest in secrecy and the public interest in disclosure in drug-approval processes. This auction shall
take place immediately after the drug is approved to market and be
conducted by the relevant agency in a strictly regulated proceeding.
To amplify the impact on scientific progress, the data shall be disclosed to at least the two highest bidders, with the number of winning bids dependent on the total number of bidders. Preventing
abuse of confidentiality, unauthorized use of the data, and secret
agreements among the bidders is particularly important. Besides severe monetary sanctions, breaching parties may also be excluded
from future auctions. Information substantially important to a manufacturer's business will not be part of the auctioned data. The auction model will not implicate current law, including patent law or
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Part I of the Article defines "sensitive information" and describes
the current handling of sensitive information in the U.S. and European drug-approval processes by outlining the general approval
5.
6.
7.

See infra Parts I.B.I., I.C.1.
See infra Parts 1.B.2., I.C.2.
See infra Parts II.C.-E.
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procedure and exploring the legal framework and its implementation regarding information disclosure. Part I also demonstrates that
the suggested new approach can be applied to both U.S. and EU
processes. Part II describes and evaluates the private and public interests involved and analyzes current and other possible approaches. Finally, Part II discusses the auction model in detail.

I. CURRENT LAWS IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE

A. Defining "Sensitive Information"
The term "sensitive information," for the purposes of this Article,
is construed broadly and comprises all information that is kept secret by the manufacturer, has a commercial value to its owner because of such secrecy, and must be disclosed to government
agencies during the drug-approval process. "Sensitive information,"
as defined here, does not refer to data that are part of patents registered during the approval process. The auction model will not interfere with the legal regime of patent law and its method of
making information available.
A "secret," for purposes of this Article, is "a piece of information
that is intentionally withheld by one or more social actors from one
or more other social actors."8 "Commercial value" includes secret
aspects of information that provide a company with an advantage
over its competitors because of said secrecy. This Article restricts
the definition of "sensitive information" to information that has to
be disclosed to the relevant government agency, because the government agency is only in these cases in a position to dispose of the
information.
The so-called "clinical trial protocol" and the protocol amendments are typically particularly valuable among the information required for the application process9 for a medicinal product,
according to the standard- of the International Conference on
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH standard).10 They contain

8.

See

KIM LANE

SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALrrY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON

LAw 12 (1988).
9.

See infra Parts I.B.I., I.C.1.

10.

See infra Part I.C.1.
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detailed information on a trial's objective and purpose, design, selection and withdrawal of subjects, and methods employed," as well
as precise information on the toxicological and pharmacological effects of the product that is fai more detailed than information
needed for a patent application.12 This information is of significant
strategic interest for competitors.
The term "sensitive information" is used instead of "trade
secrets" to avoid ambiguity, given the disputed scope of "trade
secrets"' 3 and the legal consequences the qualification as "trade secret" implicates (although the predominant definition is interpreted broadly, and includes basically all information that is kept
4
secret and thus provides competitive value to a company) .1

B. Sensitive Information in the U.S. Drug-Approval Process
1. General Drug-Approval Procedure
The FDA drug-approval process 15 begins with submitting a completed Investigational New Drug (IND) application to the FDA that
contains information on animal pharmacology and toxicology studies, manufacturing information, clinical protocols, and investigator
information.' 6 Prior to submitting this application, the drug's manufacturer must, among other things, conduct preclinical animal
17
tests for pharmacological activity and acute toxicity potential.
11. See EUR. MED. AGENCY, GUIDELINE FOR GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE 31-34 (2002), available at http://www.emea.europa.eu/docs/enGB/document-library/ScientficIguideline/
2009/09/WC500002874.pdf.
12.
See ESTHER PFAFF, ExaIKLUsmTAT UND ZUGANG ARZNEIMITTELRECHTLICHER ZULASSUNGSINFOlMATIONEN 52 (2009); Roger A. Yates, Conduct of Clinical Tials: Good Clinical Practice,in
THE TEXTBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 239, 246 (John P. Griffin &John O'Grady eds.,
2006).
13.
See, e.g., Dawn Rudenko Albert, Trade Secrets in the United States, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.,
July/Aug. 2010, at 93, available at http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/article.ashx?g=
e85a7dee-1c0f-42e0-8573-6cf922e57c ld.
14.
Cf UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) ("'Trade secret' means
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.").
15.
The following shall describe the standard and most common course of the FDA
drug-approval process, leaving out, for instance, variations for specific types of drugs.
16.
Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications
/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/default.htm (last updated June 6, 2011).
17.
See id.
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Consideration of the application proceeds if the testing shows "sufficient hints of drug efficacy" to conclude that testing in humans is
warranted."' The preclinical phase usually takes three to four years
to complete.1 9
Upon approval of the IND application, the "investigative" drug
enters three phases of clinical trials. Phase I roughly characterizes
the drug's safety and profile by testing the drug on twenty to eighty
volunteers who are usually healthy.2 0 If the studies prove that the
drug is not inordinately toxic-which approximately two-thirds
do 2 1-the manufacturer may proceed to Phase 11.22
In Phase II, the manufacturer conducts well-controlled, closely
monitored clinical studies on several hundred patients with the disease or condition that the drug is intended to cure or improve.
These studies obtain preliminary data on the drug's effectiveness,
common short-term side effects, and risks. 23 If closer examination
of the drug's toxicity does not suggest further risks and preliminary
evidence indicates the drug is effective, the sponsor may proceed to
Phase 111.24
In Phase III, large-scale, randomized trials are conducted on several hundred to several thousand people to gather additional information on the drug's effectiveness and safety. This information is
needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship.25 The results of the Phase III clinical trials typically form the essential basis
for the FDA's decision to approve the new drug. Only approximately 10 percent of medications fail Phase 111.26
The drug's sponsor then submits a New Drug Application
(NDA), the formal proposal to the FDA to approve a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the United States. 27 An NDA and
its accompanying documentation are meant to tell "the drug's
whole story," 28 particularly results and special occurrences during
pre-clinical and clinical trials, the drug's ingredients, how the drug
behaves in the body, and how it is manufactured, processed, and
Lurie & Zieve, supra note 1, at 87.
18.
19.
Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The Drug-ApprovalProcess, 14 J.
AM. BoARD F A. PRAtc. 362, 364 (2001).
20.
See FDA, supra note 16.
21.
Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 19, at 365.
22.
Lurie & Zieve, supta note 1, at 87.
23.
See FDA, supra note 16.
See id.
24.
See id.
25.
26.
Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 19, at 366.
27.
New Drug Application, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApproval
Process/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplication
NDA/default.htm (last updated May 18, 2012).
28.
Id.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 46:1

packaged.29 An NDA can easily encompass up to one hundred thousand pages3 0 and contains vast amounts of information. It enables
FDA reviewers to assess
* whether the drug is safe and effective for its proposed
use(s) and whether the benefits of the drug outweigh its
risks;
* whether the drug's proposed label is appropriate, and if
not, what the drug's label should contain; and
whether the methods used in manufacturing the drug and
the controls used to maintain the drug's quality are adequate to preserve the drug's identity, dosage, quality, and
31
purity.
The review process of an NDA is generally completed within a
year or, if the drug is deemed to be a "significant improvement
32
compared to marketed products," within six months.
The whole approval process typically takes a considerable
amount of time. Getting a drug onto pharmacy shelves may take up
to fifteen years from the start of its development.3 3 The average
costs are estimated to range from under $100 million up to $2 billion 34 depending on the study. This calculation does not take into
account that only a fraction of drugs developed in laboratories proceed to human testing, and that only about 20 percent of the
3
compounds tested in humans will be approved by the FDA5.

29.
30.

Id.; see also Lurie & Zieve, supra note 1, at 88.
ELAINE WHITMORE, DEVELOPMENT OF FDA-REGULATED MEDICAL PRODUCTS: PRESCRIP-

TION DRUGS, BIOLOGICS, AND MEDICAL DEVICES

31.

46 (2d ed. 2004).

FDA, supra note 16.

32. Lurie & Zieve, supra note 1, at 88; see also Fast Track, Accelerated Approval and Priority
Review, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forpatientadvocates/speeding
accesstoimportantnewtherapies/ucm128291.htm#priorityreview (last updated Aug. 2, 2012).
33.
See Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on PharmaceuticalIntellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REv. 93, 94 (2004). Other sources state eight to twelve years. See Lipsky & Sharp, supra note
19, at 364.
34.

See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US
Do ABOUT IT 46 (2004) (estimating costs of "well under $100 million"); Christopher Paul Adams & Van Vu Brantner, Spending on New Drug Development, 19 HEALTH ECON.
130, 141 (2010) (over $1 billion); Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantmer, Estimating the
Cost of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH Aru. 420, 420-27 (2006)
($500 million to $2 billion); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of
Drug Development Costs, 22J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) ($802 million).
35. Joseph A. DiMasi, Risks in New Drug Development: Approval Success Rates for InvestigationalDrugs, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 297, 298-305 (2001).
AND WHAT TO
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2. The Legal Framework Regarding Disclosure
and Its Implementation
The legal framework pertaining to the disclosure of sensitive information in drug-approval documentation is complicated and confusing. Relevant provisions are scattered throughout several statutes
and regulations, including the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR),
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 6 the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) , 37 the Federal Trade Secrets Act
(FTSA) 38 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) .39 This
section focuses on the most important provisions and their implementation by the FDA, without going into too much detail regarding their content and interrelationships.
The legal framework governing sensitive information disclosure
did not provide for substantial automatic disclosure of the application documentation until the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 (2007 FDAAA).40 Before 2007, one could
only find cursory information and some details about the label and
approval history on the FDA homepage (e.g., drug labels submitted
by the producer and the FDA's letters to the producer) .41 But the
2007 FDAAA brought significant changes.
Section 801 of the 2007 FDAAA requires that the FDA include
more information in a clinical trial registry databank, which includes data from trials for drugs, biological products, and medical
devices, in accordance with the consensus data elements set of the
World Health Organization. 42 However, section 8010) (2) (A) (ii)
specifies the information required to be included in the databank.
That section explicitly excludes information of Phase I clinical investigations,43 which prevents competitors from finding out about a
new product in an early stage and selling the product earlier than
the original manufacturer. Despite the detailed list of information
that must be included in the database, the amount of trial data that
36.
See infra notes 44-57, 60 and accompanying text.
37.
See, e.g., infra note 61 and accompanying text.
38.
See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
39.
See, e.g.,
Federal Advisory Commitlee Act, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
Regulatorylnformation/Legislation/ucm161158.htm (last updated Aug. 17, 2009).
40.
See, e.g., ERIN D. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARcH SERV., RL 34465, FDA AMENDMENTS Acr
OF 2007 (P.L. 110-85) 12 passim (2008). The FDA still need not publish the content of Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) evaluations on why a specific drug has been approved or other details of the application data unless someone requests that data. See infTa
text accompanying notes 43-51.
41.
See, e.g., ERIN D. WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 12, 36, 83.
42.
See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§ 801 (j)(3)(D)(vi), 121 Stat. 823, 912 (2007).
43.
See § 801 (j) (1) (A) (iii).
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must be disclosed is quite unclear. In particular, provisions regarding the trial protocol leave room for interpretation. Pursuant to section 801 (j) (3) (D) (iii) (III), "[t]he full protocol or such information
on the protocol for the trial as may be necessary to help to evaluate
44
the results of the trial" is required.
Section 801 (j) (6) (A) also includes an important limitation on
the disclosure of clinical trial information that is protected by the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This limitation-5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (4), which excludes "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" from the disclosure requirement-is particularly relevant
in this context. The essential question is, what falls under "trade
secrets" and "privileged or confidential commercial information"
pursuant to FOIA?
A nearly identical issue arises regarding the scope of requests for
information. According to 21 C.F.R. § 20.20 (a) and (c), which contain the policy on disclosure of Food and Drug Administration
Records, the FDA will make the "fullest possible disclosure of
records to the public" 45 upon request, "regardless whether any justification or need for such records have been shown." 46 (Specific provisions concerning the disclosure of the drug application
documentation can be found in 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.430 and
312.130.) 4 7 However, the fullest possible disclosure shall be "consistent with the rights of individuals to privacy, the property rights of
persons in trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial
information, and the need for the agency to promote frank internal
policy deliberations and to pursue its regulatory activities without
disruption." 48 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.60 through 20.67 contains exemptions from the disclosure obligation that reflect these considerations. For instance, § 20.61 stipulates an exception for "[t]rade
secrets and commercial or financial information which is privileged
or confidential"-wording identical to that in FOIA. 49 Naturally, an
information request pursuant to FOIA raises the same question of
interpretation.
When trying to explore the extent of FOIA exceptions, one has
to bear in mind FOIA's objectives. FOIA generally allows public access to all documentation that forms the records of agencies of the
executive branch, without the need to show a specific reason for the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

§ 801 (j) (1)(A) (iii).
See 21 C.F.R. § 20.20(a) (2012).
See 21 C.F.R. § 20.20(c) (2012).
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.130, 314.430 (2012).
21 C.F.R. § 20.20(a) (2011).
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (4) (West 2010).
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request. 50 It is thereby meant to foster a transparent relationship
between the state and citizens and ensure that government agencies
are acting on behalf of the people.-5 In practice, corporations,
rather than private citizens, submit the vast majority of FOIA
52
requests.
Courts have yet to clearly define the scope of exceptions to disclosure under FOIA, despite having considered the matter in several cases. 5 3 The Supreme Court has held that the exemptions in 5
54
U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) do not constitute an absolute bar to disclosure.
Determining whether certain information constitutes a "trade secret" or "commercial information" requires balancing private and
public interests. 55 With commercial information, the decisive consideration often seems to be whether the disclosure is likely to
"cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person
from whom the information was obtained" 56-part of a two-pronged test to define "confidentiality."
The courts and the FDA typically interpret exceptions to FOIA
rather broadly, which favors secrecy. 5 7 Hence, documentation in
the drug-approval process that manufacturers identify as a trade secret or as otherwise commercially relevant is not commonly disclosed to the public. Although the plain text of the legal framework
suggests otherwise, sensitive information included in the documentation for drug approval is well protected because of the courts' and
the FDA's expansive interpretation of the exceptions to FOJA.
50.
See FOIA.Cov, U.S. DEP'T oF JUSTICE, http://www.foia.gov/abot.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2012).
51.
Id.; Bertrand Wagenbaur, Der Yugang zu EU-Dokumenten-Transparenzzum Anfassen,
EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFTSREcI-T 680, 680

(2001).

52.
Eric Lipton, Republican Congressman Proposes Tracking Freedom of Information Act Requests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/0l/29/us/politics/
29issa.html; see also Andreas Theuer, Der Zugang zu Umweltinformationen an/grund des Umweltinformationsgesetzes (UIG), NEUE ZEITSCHRI T FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 326, 333 (1996).
53.
See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290-91 (1979); Pub. Citizen Health
Research Grp. v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 901-02 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Pub. Citizen Health Research
Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (D.C. Gir. 1983); Pub. Citizen Health Research Crp. v.
Nat'l Inst. of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2002); Pub. Citizen Health Research
Grp. v. FDA, No. Civ.A. 99-0177(JR), 2000 WL 34262802, at *4 (D.D.C. 2000); Pub. Citizen
Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 997 F. Supp. 56, 60-61 (D.D.C. 1998); Citizens Comm'n on
Human Rights v. FDA, No. 92CV5313, 1993 WL 1610471, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Teich v.
FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243, 252-54 (D.D.C. 1990). For a detailed evaluation, see Mustafa Unla, It
Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start DisclosingDrug Trial Data, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
Rav. 511, 525-35 (2010).
54.
See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 291-92; Unhi, supra note 53, at 525.
55.
See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293.
56.
Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 704 F.2d at 1290-91.
57.
See Janene Boyce, Disclosure of Clinical Trial Data: Why Exemption 4 of the Freedom of
Information Act Should be Restored, 2005 DuKEL . & TECH. RFv. 3, at
16-19.
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The FTSA further restricts disclosure. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905, any government employee shall not disclose confidential information acquired in the course of employment "in any manner or
to any extent not authorized by law." 58 To be "authorized by law"
requires that the party demanding disclosure establish "a nexus between the regulations and some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress.."59 According to the Supreme Court,
FOIA does not meet this requirement. 6 In practice, however, this
limitation on disclosure is not as restrictive as it first appears. The
FFDCA's labeling requirements, for instance, constitute an authori61
zation by law allowing a disclosure.
Despite the FDA's restrictive disclosure policy, threats to the secrecy of a manufacturer's sensitive information remain. Congress
and its committees and subcommittees cannot be denied access to
any information related to the drug-approval process on the basis of
trade secrecy. 62 This poses a risk to sensitive information, as members of Congress might openly discuss trade secrets under the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.6 3 And the mere fact that
the FDA possesses confidential information heightens the risk of
disclosure. Given that the FDA has to handle a huge amount of
data, which has to be stored, analyzed, and, in part, passed on to
other government agencies, companies, or the public, accidental
disclosure of confidential information cannot be ruled out and has
64
happened in the past.

C. Sensitive Information in the European Drug-Approval Process
The handling of sensitive information in the European drugapproval process closely resembles that in the U.S. process. The
drug-approval process in the European Union is governed by two
main objectives: "safeguarding public health 65 and advancing the
58.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 2012).
59.
Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 304.
60.
Id. at 303-04.
61.
See id. at 306 n.38; Onh, supra note 53, at 536.
62.
21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (Supp. 2012).
63.
See Wearly v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 462 F. Supp. 589, 600 n.13 (D.N.J. 1978) (referencing SenatorJoseph McCarthy's "practice" of making public disclosures of protected information under the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a
Balance: When Should Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosureto the Government?, 96 IowA L. REv. 791,
817 (2011).
64.
SeeJerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Myers
v. Williams, 819 F. Supp. 919, 920 (D. Or. 1993); Rowe, supra note 63, at 815-16.
65.
Directive 2001/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November
2001 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, Recital 2,
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development of the pharmaceutical industry and trade in medicinal
products within the European Community. ' 66 The approval process
is divided into a centralized and a non-centralized procedure on
the European level and exists alongside national approval
processes. Because the vast majority of new drugs are registered via
the centralized procedure, the following section will focus solely on
that procedure.

1. General Drug Approval Procedure
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, regarding "procedures for the
authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human
and veterinary use," provides a detailed legal framework for the EU
approval process. The centralized drug-approval process on the European level starts with an application to the European Medicines
Agency (EMA) to authorize the medical product. 67 To facilitate the
entire process, the EMA strongly encourages applicants to discuss
any procedural or regulatory issues on the proposed submission
with the EMA before applying. 68 The applicant must also notify the
EMA of its intention to apply and provide a "realistic estimate" of
the date of submission at least seven months before submission, 69
which enables the EMA to prepare for the authorization proceedings. This notification must therefore include a fair amount of information on the new drug to give the necessary overview of its
70
characteristics.
Article 6 lists the documents required for the application for authorization. To enhance the efficient organization of the approval
procedure, applicants must use the EU Common Technical Document (CTD). 71 The CTD is an internationally approved format for
presenting data necessary for drug approval within the ICH regions
2001 O.J. (L 311) 67; Regulation 726/2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 31 March 2004 Laying Down Community Procedures for the Authorisation and Supervision of Medicinal Products for Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing a European
Medicines Agency, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 1.
66.
Directive 2001/83, 2001 O.J. 67; Regulation 726/2004, Recital 8 2004 O.J. (L 136) 3.
67.
Regulation 726/2004, art. 4(1), 2004 O.J. (L 136) 9.
68.
See FUR. COMM'N,
ENTER. & INDUS. DIR.-GEN., PROCEDURES FOR MARKETING
AUTHORISATION: CENTRALISED PROCEDURE 10 (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/health

/files/eudralex/vol-2/a/chap4rev200604en.pdf.
69.
See id.
70.
For a detailed list of desired information, see id. at 10-11.
71.
EUR. COMM'N, ENTER. AND INDUS. DIR.-GEN., MEDICINAL PRODUCTS
PRESENTATION AND CONTENT OF TIHE DOSSIER 2 (2005),

FOR HUMAN USE:

available at http://ec.europa.eu/

health/files/eudralex/vol-2/b/partl a.userguide_03-2005_en.pdf.
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of Europe, the United States, and Japan. 72 It consists of five modules that cover, among other things, the new drug's quality and documentation of non-clinical and clinical trials.7 3
Once submitted, the EMA's Committee for Medicinal Products
for Human Use (CHMP) 74 verifies whether the application complies with Directive 2001/83/EC. 75 In accordance with Article 7(a)
of Regulation 726/2004, the Committee also examines whether the
application satisfies the conditions for granting a marketing authorization, which relate to "the quality, safety, and efficacy of a medicinal product."76 A valid application must be reviewed within 210 days
after receipt; 77 the time limit is reduced to 150 days for medicinal
products of major interest for therapeutic innovation. 78 The CHMP
completes its review by issuing an opinion in the name of the EMA
regarding the admissibility of the product. 79 This opinion is sent to
the European Commission, the EU Member States, and the applicant within fifteen days of being issued, and is accompanied by a
report that describes the "assessment of the medicinai product" and
states the reasons for the CHMP's conclusions. 80
The Commission then prepares a draft of its decision with respect to the application, which is forwarded to the Member States
and the applicant.8 1 If the Commission favors granting the marketing authorization, the draft should include or reference the
CHMP's summary of the product's characteristics, details of any
conditions or restrictions on the medical product, any recommended conditions or restrictions on its safe and effective use, and
the draft text of the labeling and package leaflet proposed by the
applicant.8 2 The Member States are then allowed to comment on
the draft and call for a plenary discussion.8 3 The Commission's final
decision on the application is due within fifteen days of the end of
this procedure.8 4 The Commission's marketing authorization is
valid throughout the European Community for five years,8 5 with the
72.
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opportunity to renew for an unlimited period after a re-evaluation
by the EMA.8 6

2. The Legal Framework Regarding Disclosure
and Its Implementation
Within the past ten years, the EMA has developed a system of
electronic databases on medicinal information known as EU
Telematics. 87 An important database for the purposes of this Article
is the publicly accessible "EudraPharm" database8 8 It includes a
Summary of Product Characteristics (SPC), which informs healthcare professionals about how to use the product safely and effectively,8 9 as well as the Package Leaflet, which contains basically the
same information but is more understandable to laypeople. 90 A separate databank contains the so-called European Public Assessment
Report (EPAR), which the EMA publishes immediately after granting its approval. 9' The EPAR includes the EMA's reasons for granting the authorization and a "summary written in a manner that is
understandable to the public. '9 2 But Article 13(3) of Regulation
No. 726/2004 limits the disclosure of sensitive information, stipulating that any information of a "commercially confidential nature"
must be deleted upfront.9 3 Neither the regulation itself nor the legislative history provide for any further explanation on how the term
"commercially confidential nature" should be understood. As one
cannot fully compare the EPAR's original, full version and the published version without information of a "commercially confidential
nature," the EPA's policy of protecting sensitive information can
hardly be assessed. However, since pharmaceutical companies help
generate the data, one can presume a generous attitude towards
the industry's requests regarding the deletion of potentially sensitive information.
Article 13(2) also stipulates that the marketing authorization of a
new drug shall be published in the OfficialJournal of the European
86.
Id. at art. 14(1)-(3), 15.
87.
EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY, INTRODUCTION TO ThE EU TELEMATICS PROGRAM 3-5
(2010).
88.
See Regulation 726/2004, art. 57(1)(l), 2004 O.J. (L 136) 36.
89.
Summary of Product CharacteristicsDefinition, EUDRAPHARM, http://eudrapharm.eu/
eudrapharm/glossary.do (last visited August 9, 2012).
90.
Package Leaflet Definition, EUDRAPHARM, http://eudrapharm.eu/eudrapharm/
glossary.do (last visited Aug. 9, 2012).
91.
See Regulation 726/2004, art. 13(3), 2004 O.J. (L 136) 14.
92.
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93.
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Union and shall specify the "date of authorisation, the registration
number in the Community Register, any International Non-proprietary Name (INN) of the active substance, the pharmaceutical
form, and any Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Code (ATC) .94
With regard to the disclosure of drug application information
upon request, European law provides for a general right of information against the European institutions similar to the FOIA95 in
Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.96 However, Article 4(2)
of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 stipulates a broad exception,
providing that access to documents shall be refused "where disclosure would undermine the protection of commercial interests of a
natural or legal person, including intellectual property."'9 7 The
EMA adopted this exception with the exact same wording. 98 Given
the agency's broad discretion to interpret whether disclosure would
undermine the protection of commercial interests, and the lack of
clear guidelines, it is again difficult to assess how this exception is
applied in practice. The way private and public interests are balanced in the disclosure of sensitive information in Europe very
much depends on the practice of a given agency. 99 Because it appears easy to claim that "commercial interests" exist, and because
the parties involved are not consulted (letting the decision fall
solely to the agency), the EMA will presumably tend to comprehensively protect the manufacturers' interest in secrecy. 0 0
In sum, the unrequested disclosure of drug application data includes a fair amount of information but is thoroughly filtered for
sensitive data. Information requests pursuant to Regulation (EC)
No. 1049/2001 are unlikely to lead to a disclosure of sensitive data
due to the regulation's broad exceptions.

C. Comparison of U.S. and EU Models
The United States and Europe are quite similar in how they handle sensitive information and the entire drug-approval process.
94.
Id. at art. 13(2).
95.
See supra Part I.B.2.
96.
Council Regulation 1049/2001, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
30 May 2001 Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission
Documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145), 43.
97.
Id. at art. 4(2).
98.
See Rules for Implementation of Regulation 1049/2001 on Access to EMEA Documents of 19 December 2006, art. 3(2) (a), 2 (EMEA Management Board), available at http://
www.ema.europa.eu/docs/enGB/documentlibrary/Other/2010/2/WC500070829.pdf.
99.
Wdgenbaur, supra note 51, at 684.
100. PFAFF, supra note 12, at 218-19,

FALL

2012]

Balancing Secrecy & Disclosure in Drug Approvals

Both make a fair amount of information accessible to the public on
the one hand, and-despite disclosure-friendly wording in relevant
provisions-provide for a high level of protection of sensitive information on the other. Both systems attach great importance to the
manufacturers' interest in the secrecy of commercially relevant information and are thus simultaneously vulnerable to disregarding
the public interest 1 in disclosure. These similarities make it possible to apply the approach suggested below' 1 2 to both the U.S. and
European models. Allowing U.S. and European companies to participate in identical processes is particularly desirable, as opportunities for efficiency and scientific advancement increase when more
parties are involved. In addition, adopting a multinational solution
is appropriate for the increasing globalization of the medical sciences and pharmaceutical industries, and will likely decrease regulatory burdens on corporations.

II.

DEVELOPING A NEW APPROACH

Based upon the foregoing findings, this Part will develop a new
approach for the handling of sensitive information in the drug-approval process that strikes a balance between the manufacturers'
interest in secrecy and the public interest in disclosure. The starting
point shall be an evaluation of these colliding interests, followed by
a critique of the existing models in the United States and Europe
and a short discussion of other possible alternatives. The section
ends with a detailed description and substantiation of the suggested
new model.

A. Interests Involved in Deciding Whether to Disclose
Sensitive Information
1. The Manufacturers' Interest in Secrecy
The most important interest for manufacturers in keeping application information secret is the commercial value of such information. The knowledge of a competitor's research data can have
significant consequences in today's fast-moving pharmaceutical
101.

See supra Part I.A.2.

102.

See infra Part II.F.
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market. Lead-time to market-the period during which a manufacturer can exclusively sell a newly introduced drug-is more important and valuable than ever before. 103 Studies conducted by the
Federal Trade Commission show that doctors tend to continue
prescribing pioneer drugs instead of substitutes that have entered
the market at a later time. 10 4 Publishing new information regarding
a medicinal product's risks after its introduction into the market
seems to have no discernible effect on how doctors prescribe. 10 5 Yet
the disclosure of sensitive information-particularly research
data-to competitors can significantly benefit competitors from a
scientific perspective. In a considerable number of cases, competitors can improve and more efficiently carry out studies from current research data regarding new versions of existing drugs or new
drugs with comparable components. 10 6 In this context, one has to
consider an important characteristic of the pharmaceutical market:
the costs of reproducing a medicinal product on the basis of a
known formula are vanishingly low compared to the costs of research. 0 7 Disclosure might enable competitors to substantially improve existing products and might even lead to the development of
new drugs' 018 that competitors can bring to market first. Furthermore, research data might reveal information about a manufacturer's product pipeline. In all of these cases, a competitor would
gain a free advantage at the expense of the manufacturer. Nondisclosure delays the development of competing generics' 0 9 and might
prevent a competitor from bringing a new product to market
first. 10
Manufacturers of innovative drugs have alleged that patents no
longer ensure a sufficient monopoly and do not adequately protect
103. See David B. Ridley et al., Developing Drugs For Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH ALT.
313, 315, 318 (2006); cf Unlai, supra note 53, at 517.
104. Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safe
Testing Information: Reforming Agency DisclosurePolicies, 93 HARv. L. REv. 837, 852 (1980).
105.

LARS NoAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY. CASES AND MAxRIALS

339

(2d ed. 2006).
106. Unlt, supra note 53, at 518; see a/soJames T. O'Reilly, Knowledge is Power: Legislative
Control of Drug Industry Trade Secrets, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 24 (1985).
107. OLIVER GASSMANN & MARTIN BADER, PATENTMANAGEMENT-INNOVATION ERFOLGREICHE NUTZEN UND SCHTZEN 127 (3rd ed. 2010); PFAFF, supra note 12, at 24.
108. HEIDE NEUKIRCHEN, DER PHARMA-REPORT: DAs GROBE GESCHAFT MIT UNSERER GE.
SUNDHErr 235 (2006); see also Alix Weisfeld, How Much Intellectual Property Protection Do the
Newest (and Coolest) Biotechnologies Get Internationally?, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 833, 836 (2006).
109. A generic drug is a product that, as compared to a reference product, has the same
composition in active substances, pharmaceutical form, and bioequivalence shown through
bioavailability studies. See Generic Product Definition, EUDRAPrHARM, http://eudrapharm.eu/
eudrapharm/glossary.do (last visited Aug. 11, 2012).
110. JnlOI, supra note 53, at 517.
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their interests, given that drug development cycles have lengthened
and the patent exclusivity term is now purportedly too short.11 1 Patent law thus arguably offers only a theoretical and ineffective solution to the conflict between a producer's interest in secrecy and the
public interest in disclosure.
Competitors might also free ride on a manufacturer's efforts to
obtain regulatory approval in foreign markets, if the foreign market
allows applicants to refer to existing data of trials that they did not
conduct. 112 A competitor could then avoid separate trials and save a
considerable amount of money, thereby gaining a competitive advantage over the original manufacturer.
Strict confidentiality of the application information can also protect the manufacturer from attacks against the authorized drug itself. As the research data contains information about the drug's
risks and side effects, its non-disclosure minimizes third-party
scrutiny. 13 With less detailed knowledge about the research data,
the manufacturer's potential liability will be harder to prove and
the exposure to legal claims reduced. 1 4 The manufacturer is also
less vulnerable to competitors' efforts to emphasize the drug's
weaknesses (e.g., through advertisements).' 15

2. The Public Interest in Disclosure
The public interest in disclosure of the data required for a drug
approval application has three main aspects: first, disclosure fosters
an impartial and objective review of the FDA's'1 6 approval process;

second, it allows practitioners to prescribe drugs in a more tailored
fashion and more thoroughly describe risks and side effects to their
patients; and third, it advances scientific progress and thereby ameliorates public health challenges.
111. See Unlfl, supra note 53, at 516; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 345, 348-49 (2007); Kuhlik, supranote 33, at
96-97. For more information on European patent law, see generally Ulrich M. Gassner, Unterlagenschutz im Europaischen Arzneimittelrecht, GRURI r. 983, 984 (2004).
112. Unl1, supra note 53, at 517-18; O'Reilly, supra note 106, at 23.
113.

Onld, supra note 53, at 518.
114. See OnlY, supra note 53, at 518; Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Access in an Innovation
Intensive Economy: ReorderingInformation Privileges in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, 78
U. COLO. L. REv. 465, 520-21 (2007).
115. OnlaI, supra note 53, at 518; Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 383.
116. Although the following section refers only to the FDA, the same arguments apply to
the EMA.
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Impartial review of the FDA approval process

Ensuring the safety and efficacy of medicinal products in the
United States mainly lies in the hands of the FDA. Safety and efficacy can only be widely guaranteed if the application process ensures a thorough examination of the provided data. However,
without access to the data on which the FDA bases its decision to
approve an application, there is no mechanism for an independent
review of the FDA's work. Naturally, there is a public interest in the
ability to review the work of a government agency, especially one
having such a direct impact on public health. Moreover, there are
other circumstances regarding the FDA's work that particularly
must be considered.
First, because of the vast amount of data, the time pressure of the
drug-approval process, 117 the complexity of the matter in question,
and the FDA's limited resources, mistakes are inevitable." 8 The
FDA simply cannot thoroughly review every single page of a one
hundred thousand-page application, 119 and is particularly vulnerable when new scientific information or emerging methodologies re1 20
quire reevaluating an earlier approval.
Second, it will often be difficult for the FDA to assess whether the
research data provided by the manufacturer "meet the objectivity
standards of the scientific process," especially when certain studies
fall in the grey area between objective and clearly fraudulent and
dishonest.1 2 ' Involving outside academic researchers does not guarantee an objective process, as there are a number of ways in which
manufacturers can influence the results of academic work.1 22
117. See supra Parts I.B.1 and I.C.3.
118. See PFAFF, supra note 12, at 28; Jennifer Couzin, LegislatorsPropose a Registry to Track
Clinical Trialsfrom Start to Finish, 305 SCIENCE 1695, 1695 (2004); Drummond Rennie, Trial
Registration-A Great Idea Switches from Ignored to Irresistible, 292 J.Am.MED. Ass'N 1359, 1359
(2004).
119. See ROBERT M. RVDZEWSKI, REAL WORLD DRUG DIscovERY-A CHEMIST'S GUIDE TO
BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH 147 (2008); Sidney A. Shapiro, DivorcingProfitMotivation from New Drug Research: A Consideration of Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test
Data,1978 DUKE L.J. 155, 158 ("[M]ost FDA reviewers randomly audit certain sections of the
several hundred volumes of raw data. They find it impossible, however, to review every page
of the submitted information.").
120. See UnIl, supra note 53, at 518; McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 104, at 841.
121. Unli, supra note 53, at 518; see also Wendy E. Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private
Research, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 122-25 (2004) (discussing quality of data issues that can
arise in privately sponsored scientific research).
122. See Catherine D. DeAngelis & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Impugning the Integrity of Medical
Science: The Adverse Effects of Industry Influence, 299J. Am. MED. AsS'N 1833, 1833-34 (2008);
Joseph S. Ross et al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwritingin PublicationsRelated to Rofecoxib: A Case
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Third, it seems that the medical literature is distorted by the selective publishing of favorable trial results. 123 Studies with negative
or inconclusive results are unlikely to be the basis for a report or
24
article, possibly because they are presumed to be uninteresting.1
Therefore, favorable results of a study will be published in various
forms in different journals.12 5 Publication bias leads to "overly optimistic portrayals of treatments and interventions" in the scientific
literature.

26

Admittedly, the FDA cannot solve this problem, be-

cause suppression of adverse test data by a manufacturer causes the
FDA to lack important information. 27 Rather, there is a need for
obligatory registration of every conducted trial in a centralized
128
database to allow for comprehensive review.

b.

Efficient application of drugs

Disclosing research data of a medicinal product also provides
practitioners with deeper insight into the way the product functions
and its risks and side effects. Knowledge about when administering
a drug showed or did not show a certain effect might enable practitioners to prescribe the drug to their patients in a significantly
more efficient manner. It would allow a critical review of the treatment's value to an individual patient. 129 Insofar as this occurred,
Study of Industry Documents from Rofecoxib Litigation, 299 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 1800, 1800-10
(2008); Shapiro, supra note 120, at 164; Wagner & Michaels, supra note 121, at 120.
123. See Lisa N. Abaid et al., Reducing Publication Bias of Prospective Clinical Tials Through
Trial Registration, 76 CONTRACEPTION 339, 339 (2007); Couzin, supra note 118, at 1695; Richard Hall et al., PublicationBias in the Medical Literature: A Review by a CanadianResearch Ethics
Board, 54 CAN. J. ANESTHIEsLA 380, 381-87 (2007); Rennie, supra note 118, at 1359; Erick H.
Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant 7rials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy,
358 NEw ENO. J. MED. 252, 254 (2008).
124. See lain Chalmers, UnderreportingResearch Is Scientific Misconduct, 263 J. Am. MED.
Ass'N 1405, 1405-08 (1990); Hall et al., supra note 123, at 385-86; Barry M. Massie, Negative,
Neutral, and Discordant Results: What Should an Editor Do?, 9 J. CARDIAC FAILuRfc 77, 77-79
(2003); Alexa T. McCray, Better Access to Information About Clinical Trials, 133 ANNALs INTERNAL
MED. 609, 611 (2000).
125. McCray, supra note 124, at 611.
126. Abaid et al., supra note 123, at 339.
127. See McCray, supra note 124, at 609-10; Turner et al., supranote 123, at 256-57; Unlci,
supra note 53, at 519.
128. SeeAbaid et al., supranote 123, at 341; Chalmers, supra note 124, at 1407-08; Hall et
al., supra note 123, at 387; Mcray, supra note 124, at 611-13. Regarding current developments, see Sheetal Parekh-Bhurke et al., Uptake of Methods to Deal with Publication Bias in Systematic Reviews Has Increased over Time, but There is Still Much Scope for Improvement, 64 J.
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 349 (2011). Regarding some of the currently existing databases listing information on drug trials, see infra Parts I.B.2 and I.C.4.
129. PFAFF, supra note 12, at 52; Abaid et al., supra note 123, at 339; cf Boyce, supra note
57, at
1-3, 11-13.
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disclosure would improve public health. Admittedly, not every practitioner will necessarily resort to such data, but the availability might
still promote a more adequate treatment of a significant number of
patients.

c.

Scientific progress

Finally, and probably most importantly, the public interest in the
disclosure of research data can be based on the advancement of
clinical and medical science resulting from disclosure. Because of
the tremendous technological developments that have significantly
increased the sophistication of today's studies in life sciences (particularly in genomics), and the sheer amount of data and other information produced, the world is facing unprecedented
opportunities for scientific progress.130 Innovations in computer science and information technology allow for a degree of data evaluation unimaginable just twenty years ago. The new field of
bioinformatics and innovative data-mining technologies enable new
forms of dataset comparisons and analyses, searches for unknown
interrelations, and evaluations of data quality and validity. 13 1 These
insights can lead to a better understanding of the interplay of different factors, reevaluation of a drug's safety and efficacy, and new
discoveries. Naturally, these forms of data processing depend on
the availability of data. Tapping the full scientific potential of research data and making the best possible use of the current level of
technology requires public disclosure of all research data in an organized form. Such disclosure would also rapidly enhance the efficiency and speed of scientific research. Tasks such as trials and
combining key components would only have to be conducted once,
instead of several times by different parties, and the data generated
could be used for new trials. Costs could be significantly reduced.13 2
In addition, the need for conducting the same trials multiple times
raises ethical concerns, as clinical trials can endanger participants'
health while only proving something that is already known.1 33
130. See Unld, supra note 53, at 538-41; Weisfeld, supra note 108, at 837; Bioinformatics,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/bio
informatics.html (last updated March 29, 2004).
131. See Unhi, supra note 53, at 538-41; Weisfeld, supra note 108, at 837.
132. See Onltl, supra note 53, at 544; see also Katherine M. Nolan-Stevaux, Open Source
Biology: A Means to Address the Access & Research Gaps?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 271, 282-83 (2007).
133. See Gassner, supra note 111, at 984; Hall et al., supra note 123, at 381; Valerie Junod,
Drug MarketingExclusivity Under United States and European Union Law, 59 Foon & DRUG L.J.
NAT'L CENT. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INo.,

479, 516 (2004).

FALL

2012]

Balancing Secrecy & Disclosure in Drug Approvals

Hence, there is a strong and constantly increasing public interest
in disclosure. The relationship here between disclosure and secrecy
is problematic, however: the greater the manufacturers' interest in
secrecy because of a dataset's potential to aid scientific progress and
34
benefit third parties, the greater the public interest in disclosure.

B. Evaluating Conflicting Interests
To evaluate the conflicting interests regarding the disclosure or
non-disclosure of sensitive information, one needs to identify the
potential effects that promoting the respective interests would have.
Guaranteeing the secrecy of a manufacturer's sensitive information, thereby withholding it from the other market participants, al13 5
lows manufacturers to benefit extensively from their research.
They can generate the maximum profit from their head start in
knowledge. Hence, the manufacturer's investment in research and
development is best protected by secrecy. Such a protection reputedly constitutes a strong incentive for manufacturers to invest in
research and development. 13 6 They are the exclusive beneficiaries
of the results in such a situation. A strict nondisclosure policy for
competitors' sensitive data also makes generating one's own findings essential to be able to compete. Disclosing sensitive information would likely decrease manufacturers' willingness to invest in
research and development, as such investments would not create a
significant competitive advantage. Rather, competitors could access
the results without having to bear the costs. Therefore, non-disclosure can serve as a major incentive for investments in research and
development that contribute to scientific progress. But the investments will tend to concentrate on areas promising the highest revenues, neglecting research for medication to treat rare diseases and
diseases that typically affect low-income or poorly represented
13 7
populations who cannot afford the medication.
Although it would decrease the manufacturers' willingness to invest, disclosure could foster innovation and advance scientific progress. Favoring a general disclosure of sensitive information would
most likely contribute to a more efficient use of existing scientific
134. See Unldi, supra note 53, at 519; Lyndon, supra note 114, at 480-81.
135. Although the manufacturers do not always perform the research themselves, any
company that is brought into the research process by the manufacturer will be contractually
obligated to keep the results of the research confidential.
136. See supra Part II.A.1.
137. See Thomas W. Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program, 36
METAPHILOSOPH- 182, 185-86 (2005); see also infra Part II.F.5.
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findings.138 Making research data publicly available could reduce
the costs of research and development considerably. Expensive trials would not have to be conducted again, which would offer independent or state-funded scientists more opportunities for research
that expanded on disclosed data. 139 Competitors would also benefit,
because their development costs would drop, allowing them to invest more money into research.
In addition, disclosure would enable an impartial review of the
drug-approval process, providing for enhanced drug quality and security.' 40 It would also help contribute to a more efficient drug application because of the potentially deeper understanding of the
41
drug's functioning by practitioners.'
However, a problematic issue to be considered is the interrelation between incentivizing manufacturers to do research and utilizing their scientific findings for further research. If less protection of
the manufacturers' investments in research leads to a decreased
willingness to invest, there will be fewer scientific trials conducted
and less research data produced. This effect might eventually countervail the reduction of research costs that would result from publicizing that data. Assuming that public funding-at least in the
long run-could not compensate for a significant decrease in
private investments, incentivizing manufacturers to invest in research and development is crucial to the advancement of medical
science.
The ideal balance would protect investments in research and development, incentivizing manufacturers to strive for scientific progress. At the same time, it would encourage extensive use of today's
technological opportunities to increase the efficiency of medical
research and development and substantially accelerate scientific
progress toward improving public health. Providing a combination
of incentives for the private sector to invest in research and development, while allowing the scientific community and competitors
to utilize the results, is thus desirable. A successful model should
also enable impartial review of the drug-approval process and a
more efficient drug application process.

138.
139.
140.
141.

See supra Part II.A.2.c.
See infra Part II.F.5.
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
See supra Part II.A.2.b.
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C. Criticism of Existing Models

Current approaches for handling sensitive information in the
drug-approval process show significant insufficiencies in light of the
foregoing considerations. As described above, 142 commercially relevant information is generally kept confidential in the United States
and perhaps even more so in Europe. The manufacturers' interest 14 3 in secrecy is clearly assessed as more important than the
public interests that would be promoted by disclosure, 144 such as an
impartial review of the drug-approval process, more efficient drug
application procedures, and advancing innovation by increased research efficiency. This one-sided "balance" basically disregards
these public concerns. However, the current model provides for a
strong incentive for manufacturers to invest in research and development, which serves the public interest insofar as it fosters scientific progress.

D. Full Public Disclosure
At the opposite end of the spectrum from complete confidentiality is obligatory public disclosure of the entire application documentation. However, this seems incompatible with upholding the
incentive to invest in research and development. 145 Because of the
need for private investment in research and development to advance scientific progress, 146 favoring the public interest in disclosure over the private interest in secrecy in such a way would
eventually harm the public interest by significantly slowing down
scientific progress. Since upholding an incentive for investors is crucial, full public disclosure is not a promising option.147 Furthermore, it could violate the Fifth Amendment. Sensitive information
might constitute property, such that its forced disclosure without
compensation may well be an unconstitutional taking, despite the
public interest in disclosure. 14 8
142. See supra Parts I.B.2 and I.C.4.
143. See supra Part I.A.1.
144. See supra Part I.A.2.
145. See supra Part I.B.
146. See supra Part I.B.
147. Commentators who favor full public disclosure include, among others, Onla, supra
note 53, at 544-45, and Allen L. White, Why We Need Global Standardsfor CorporateDisclosure, 69
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 183-86 (2006). For a view in favor of more restricted public
disclosure see PFAFF, supra note 12, at 281-83.
148. See infra Part II.F.3.b.4; cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01
(1984).

158
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Of course, voluntary disclosure is desirable. There are several voluntary initiatives by the pharmaceutical industry to publish trial
data in order to foster scientific progress by providing valuable information in the public interest. 149 This development, and the
trend toward further cooperation among drug manufacturing companies and between these companies and independent research
institutes,' 50 should be encouraged.

E. Nondisclosurefor a Limited Period of Time
Given the criteria described above,' 51 an ideal model might protect sensitive information for a limited period of time before making it public, and thus serve as a compromise between the current
approach of non-disclosure and complete public disclosure. Depending on the complexity and importance of the respective information, the law could provide for public disclosure a certain
number of years after the drug's approval by the FDA.
One advantage of such an approach is that manufacturers are
presumably still incentivized to invest in research, since protection
of their data for even a couple of years creates considerable value.
In the pharmaceutical industry, time is of the essence,15 2 and a head
start can decide a product's success. A side effect might be even
greater pressure to accelerate the development process, thereby
hastening scientific progress overall. Naturally, the profits from investments-and with them the incentive to invest-would be lower
compared to the situation of complete nondisclosure. At the same
time, access to the sensitive information would-although with
some years delayz-incorporate the information into scientific discourse, enhancing research efficiency.
Given today's pace of scientific advancements, two years constitutes a substantial time period. Increased efficiency largely depends
on knowledge of the current status quo in the particular field. One
can assume that several different players are working on quite similar aspects in any highly developed and popular area of research.
Under these circumstances, it is likely that different parties conduct
149. See Barbara A. Eckman et al., The Merck Gene Index Browser: An Extensible DataIntegration System for Gene Finding, Gene Characterization and EST Data Mining, 14 BOiNoRNaATIcs 2
(1998); C. VictorJongeneel, The Need for a Human Gene Index, 16 BIOINFORMATTCS 1059, 1060
(2000); Alan R. Williamson, The Merck Gene Index Project, 4 DRUG DiSCOVERY TODAY 135, 135
(1999).
150. See PFA F, supra note 12, at 149-52.
151. See supra Part I.B.
152. See supra Part I.A.1.
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similar trials within the nondisclosure period, which would have
been unnecessary if the sensitive information had been disclosed
earlier. Admittedly, the validity of this objection depends very much
on how similar the level of expertise is in the research units of different manufacturers. In any case, this consideration weakens the
efficiency argument.
Delayed public disclosure of sensitive information might favor
larger, financially stronger pharmaceutical companies. As these
companies dispose of more extensive financial, technological, and
human resources, they might be able to "catch up" with a smaller
manufacturer whose research data has been disclosed. In this case,
the financially stronger companies could benefit considerably from
the information (e.g., by bringing to market a new or improved
product based on the disclosed data). As the information was received for free, the benefit would be gained entirely at the expense
of the original manufacturer. This aspect might disincentivize
larger companies from investing in their own research, as they
could try to rely on profiting from information disclosed by others.
Simultaneously, smaller manufacturers might be discouraged from
investing, as their potential revenues would be diminished. Both
developments would hinder scientific progress and pharmaceutical
innovation.
Nonetheless, the non-disclosure of sensitive information for a
specific period of time still seems to be more balanced than and
therefore preferable to the current approach.

F The Auction Model
As it is impossible to keep the manufacturers' sensitive information secret and disclose it to the public at the same time, a model
coming as close as possible to properly balancing competing interests must provide strong incentives for manufacturers to invest in
research in spite of a disclosure obligation. To protect the manufacturers' investment, they need to be compensated for an obligatory
disclosure. Fairness dictates that those who can profit the most
from the disclosed data should pay this compensation. Presumably,
these are the competitors-innovative manufacturers-working in
the same field. As a side effect, paying for the information would
probably motivate competitors even more to advance innovation, as
they would have to try to draw profit from their investment in the
data. The competitors will only be willing to compensate manufacturers for sensitive information if they are guaranteed a certain
amount of exclusivity. Naturally, they have no interest in supplying
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the public with the information. Rather, the more exclusivity they
get, the more valuable the research data will be to them.
Access to the research data should be restricted to innovative,
brand-name manufacturers. These manufacturers can contribute to
scientific progress, whereas generic manufacturers make sure that
medicinal products are more affordable in the long run. Given that
generics can only be brought to market after a patent's expiration
and that patent information is already publicly available, generic
manufacturers usually will not be interested in the sensitive data.
Naturally, such an approach would not promote the efficiency of
scientific research to the extent that full public disclosure would.
The latter would spur significantly more participants to get involved, particularly if independent or state-funded scientists' access
to the data is increased. And practitioners would rarely be in a better position to more efficiently apply medicinal products than they
are today, as the data will not be publicly available. The chances for
an impartial review of the government agencies' work in the approval process will also, at best, be slightly improved by the mere
introduction of the auction model., 3 But the model protects incentives for research and fosters more efficient organization and acceleration of scientific progress by providing a restricted number of
additional parties with access to the research data.
Allowing independent scientists access to the data for the sole
purpose of reviewing a government agencies' authorization process
can improve transparency. A restricted form of access could also be
given to independent or state-funded scientists for research projects
in distinct areas.
When establishing an approach based on the foregoing premises, three fundamental issues have to be dealt with: first, how to
determine fair compensation and construct an obligatory disclosure procedure; second, how to ensure an impartial review of the
government agencies' approval process; and third, whether and
how to provide independent or state-funded scientists with access
for research in unrelated areas.

1. Procedure to Determine Fair Compensation
A fair level of compensation should come as close as possible to
the actual market value of the sensitive information. The market
value does not simply correspond with the costs of research for the
153.

See infta Part II.F.2.

FALL 2012]

Balancing Secrecy & Disclosure in Drug Approvals

specific medicinal product. This is because these costs do not reflect past losses for unsuccessful research in other areas, which is an
important part in calculating the costs of a successful product. Even
more importantly, the value of an innovation cannot be assessed
merely by its production costs, since others who spent the same
amount on research and looked for the same results might not have
succeeded. An innovative idea is hard to predict and not comparable to producing something already known. Its market value appears to be quite difficult to assess, because the value of the
information depends on what profit the addressee can or hopes to
generate with it. The research data are presumably of substantial
value only to competitors that are active in the same field as the
original manufacturer and either (1) see potential value in the information that the manufacturer overlooked, or (2) are confident
they can develop an improved or entirely new product on the basis
of the existing information. Hence, determining the sensitive information's market value requires a deep technical insight as well as
an inside perspective as to what competitors assume the information can be used for. The latter rests mainly on risk assumptions
regarding further investments in research and development in a
specific field.
In light of these circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that experts within the FDA 154 are in the position to determine such value
on the basis of the application information before them and their
industry insight. They particularly would lack the knowledge to detect potential uses of the application data with regard to other drug
development projects of competitors. The easiest solution-determination of fair compensation by competent, impartial government
agencies-is therefore unavailable. Rather, the parties in the best
position to assess the fair market value seem to be those competitors who think they can profit from the sensitive information themselves. Now, the question is how to make use of this knowledge,
taking into consideration that the competitors also have a substantial interest in not divulging the real value they attach to the information in order to pay a preferably low amount of compensation.
An auction model, as it is widely used in mergers and acquisitions, 55 would guarantee a compensation that would at least come
close to the actual market value of the sensitive information in most

154. As the auction model would also be implemented in European law, in the following
sections, FDA stands for both FDA and EMA, respectively, for ease of reference.
155.
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cases. According to this approach, auctioning the sensitive information would be obligatory, and it goes without saying that the manufacturers would not be allowed to otherwise disclose or sell the
information or bid for the data themselves. Of course, the manufacturers might decide to publicly disclose all application information
before the beginning of the auction process, rendering it unnecessary. In mergers and acquisitions, an auction is commonly seen as
the method most favorable to the seller of a company because it
156
maximizes revenue, on account of competition between bidders.
Since auctions are governed by clear rules, procedures, and deadlines, they ensure transparency, credibility, efficiency, and typically
15 7
take considerably less time than negotiations.
There are a number of parallels between selling a company and
selling research information, which, overall, support adoption of
the auction model. In both situations, the seller tries to assess the
actual market value, and several interested parties exist who think
they can obtain greater or different benefit than the seller from the
item on sale. In addition, not all information about the item on sale
is publicly available, making it necessary to provide the interested
parties with some sensitive information about the object in order to
enable them to determine its value.
Of course, there are significant differences. With the research
data, the seller continues to use the product himself, the object for
sale consists solely of information that the seller is obligated to sell,
and a government agency disposes of the relevant data and conducts the auction procedure. But these differences do not detract
from the auction model's suitability to determine the data's actual
market value.
In addition, the auction process in mergers and acquisitions
deals with one basic problem that would typically also arise when
determining the market value for sensitive information in the drug
application process: maintaining confidentiality while providing
necessary sensitive information to potential bidders. Potential bidders need to access sensitive information about the company to determine what the offered company is worth to them. In dealing with
sensitive information, their value in the drug-approval process can
only be determined based on the specific content of such information. In mergers and acquisitions, so-called "due diligence"-a
156.
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structured process of disclosing a certain amount of data to a specific number of interested parties to allow them to review the
data' 58 -solves this problem. Furthermore, it must be ensured that
unsuccessful bidders will not commercially use the sensitive information gained throughout the auction process. To deal with this
issue, the auction process in mergers and acquisitions provides for
strict confidentiality agreements with harsh sanctions in case of
breach.1 59 This aspect is particularly important for auctioning sensitive information, as it is impossible to reverse the disclosure of information and might sometimes be difficult to prove any
subsequent unlawful use of the data occurred.

a.

Auctions in mergers and acquisitions

The following describes a typical auction process in mergers and
acquisitions on an abstract, simplified level. The starting point is
the preparation of a so-called offering memorandum or "teaser,"
which includes rather broad information about the company to be
sold and is intended to function as an "appetizer."'"" Next, the
seller contacts prospective bidders, who are identified for strategic
or financial reasons. 161 If the potential buyers indicate interest, the
seller provides the offering memorandum after the seller signs a
confidentiality agreement. 162 Sellers often request the submission of
a nonbinding value range indicating how much a prospective bidder would be willing to pay before providing the bidder with more
detailed information. 163 Based on these nonbinding indications, the
seller then chooses the bidders who may participate in the second
round.1 64 Here, the potential purchasers are given access to a data
158.
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room with detailed information that is structured to allow due diligence regarding the target.1 65 The seller will also give presentations
on its company and answer questions in a questions and answers
procedure (Q&A) .166 The second round ends with the request to
submit a binding bid, which usually has to be accompanied by a
firm financial commitment. 67 The whole proceeding is governed
by clear rules regarding, for example, the number of questions in
Q&A or the form of bids (e.g., cash or stock). There are strict time
limits, particularly regarding the length of the due diligence and
the deadline for the binding bid.1 68 The bids will either be submitted openly or sealed. 169 In the latter case, the bid amounts are held
secret from the other bidders.170 The participant with the highest
bid will be declared the winner followed by final negotiations over
the definitive agreement. 171

b.

Application of auction procedures from mergers
and acquisitions

In light of this basic outline of a typical mergers and acquisitions
auction procedure, this section explores which parts of the procedure may be applied to the auction of sensitive information in the
drug-approval process, and how this proceeding generally should
be designed.

i. Role of the FDA
First, the role of the FDA shall be determined. I suggest that the
FDA should completely control the auction process to reduce manufacturer influence. In contrast to mergers and acquisitions, where
the owner of the target company or its advisors typically conduct
the auction process, the case of sensitive information offers the opportunity to organize the whole process through an independent
government agency to ensure a more fair and impartial procedure.
165. BRUNER, supra note 156, at 796; COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra note
156, at 105; WASSERSTEIN, supra note 160, at 747.
166. BRUNER, supra note 156, at 796.
167. BRUNER, supra note 156, at 796; COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra note
156, at 105.
168. See BRUNER, supra note 156, at 796; WASSERSTEIN, supra note 160, at 746-47.
169.
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171. BRUNER, supra note 156, at 797; COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra note
156, at 106-07.
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Since government agencies determine the disposition of all application information for the medicinal product, manufacturer involvement is generally unnecessary. Moreover, given that a manufacturer
must involuntarily relinquish exclusive commercial use of its
sensitive information for the benefit of its competitors, the manufacturer's involvement in the auction seems undesirable because of
conflicting interests. The model's efficiency naturally depends on
the FDA's resistance to corruption.
The complexity of auctioning information in a drug application
seems to be considerably lower than selling a company. A company
typically resembles a living organism, with employees; offices and/
or production sites; sophisticated internal structures; and numerous relationships with other market participants, suppliers, customers, or banks. This can create numerous legal and practical
difficulties in the sales process regarding liability, duties of
disclosure, warranties, price calculation, or other issues. And even
in an auction, the sale of a company cannot occur without complex
negotiations concerning the final agreement. In contrast, auctioning information in a drug authorization application seems to be feasible in a simpler, more standard procedure that lacks negotiations.
This makes administration by competent government agencies possible without creating unreasonable costs. There is no need for the
manufacturer's involvement, since no negotiations take place in
this context. Thus, it is irrelevant that a manufacturer's interests
could not be sufficiently represented by a government agency.

ii. First round
As a first step in the auction process, the FDA may simply continue to disclose the same data that currently accompanies its deci172
sions to approve a drug's marketing in the United States.
Participants in the pharmaceutical market are already aware of
newly approved drugs and closely follow any publications in this
regard. One can assume that this awareness will increase once a
manufacturer is obligated to disclose sensitive data pertaining to a
recently approved drug to the successful bidders of an auction.
Data that are currently disclosed also seem sufficient for market
participants to evaluate whether they are interested in further information. Hence, there is no need to separately approach potential
buyers with an appetizer like the offering memorandum. 173 In case
172.
173.
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the FDA seriously doubts that potentially interested parties will not
learn of a relevant upcoming auction, it might inform these parties
on its own account, without disclosing any further information.
To simplify matters, the FDA should announce the upcoming
auction and refer to the published data on its homepage immediately after publishing the approval. The announcement should also
stipulate the auction's timeline to ensure structured and fast proceedings. At this stage, the deadline for indicating an interest in
taking part in the auction's second round is particularly important.

iii. Second round
Like in mergers and acquisitions auctions, the second round
should provide potential buyers with information necessary to submit a binding bid. As with due diligence preparing a data room,
FDA experts should grant a selected group of potential buyers access to a revised version of the complete application documentation. This would include enough information to allow for a realistic
estimate of the data's worth-meaning more information than is
currently accessible via request 174-while still keeping the most valuable parts secret. To avoid accidental disclosure of overly sensitive
data, the FDA will give the manufacturer an opportunity to review
the documentation and to articulate any reasonable concerns that
should be considered before disclosure.
The revised version of the application documentation will not
amount to a compelling equity story of the kind a seller typically
provides to raise bids in mergers and acquisitions auctions. The
FDA, given its obligation to remain neutral, is not in a position to
prepare such an "advertisement" for potential buyers. But the manufacturer should be given the opportunity to compile a report advertising the information to be auctioned, to achieve higher bids.
Naturally, the manufacturer will be liable for any false or misleading information in its report. As the interested parties likely know
about the potential value of the information (otherwise, they would
probably not be interested in bidding to begin with), such a report
should not be obligatory.
There is a danger that interested parties will abuse their knowledge of the sensitive information and try to make use of it without
compensation. Two separate mechanisms will help prevent such
abuse. First, a nonbinding value range that potential buyers are willing to pay, and proof that a party has the means to pursue research
174.
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using the data to be auctioned, will accompany each indication of
interest. On the basis of this range, the FDA will choose a specific
number of interested parties. The concrete number should depend
on the total number of parties that express interest to prevent the
pool of potential buyers from being unnecessarily limited too early.
Second, the FDA should only disclose further information to interested parties upon executing a strict confidentiality agreement
and an agreement stipulating that information acquired during
due diligence will not be utilized, in case the party is not among the
auction's winners. Both agreements should provide for severe sanctions in case of breach. Besides monetary damages, any breaching
party will be excluded from participating in any future auctions for
a specified time, depending on the gravity of the breach.
These mechanisms cannot completely prevent abusive use of the
disclosed information. In particular, breaches of these agreements
will be difficult to prove. Passing on information and using the data
can be done quite inconspicuously. These acts typically do not involve a large number of people or a considerable effort, and are
therefore quite easy to conceal. It might be especially hard to prove
that a scientist's invention resulted from information he learned
during the second round of the auction process. And the potential
profit to be gained may be substantial.
The FDA seems to be in an excellent position to uncover such
breaches, as it will review the application documentation for any
new drug that may be based on information acquired during the
auction process, and it knows about the participants in the auction's information-gathering phase. Furthermore, the sanctions of
not only paying a high fine and possible civil damages, but also exclusion from further auctions, should function as a substantial deterrent. To ensure that a thorough examination of future drug
approval documentation will reveal potential unlawful uses of research data acquired by unsuccessful bidders, a specific taskforce of
scientific specialists could be formed at the FDA. This taskforce
could also be responsible for preparing the aforementioned report.
It could be financed through a fee to the FDA that would be determined on the basis of a certain percentage of the bids.
Once participants in the second round are chosen and sign both
agreements, they should be given time to review the disclosed data
before submitting binding offers by a specified deadline. The
length of this review period will depend on the amount of data included but should not exceed a few weeks. Between the end of the
review process and the deadline for the bids, the potential buyers
should be given a few days, or possibly up to two weeks, to decide

168
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on a binding bid. By submitting their bid, the potential buyers will
also agree to the terms of the final agreement provided before by
the FDA, which shall be non-negotiable, to increase the transparency of the auction process.
The final agreement will prohibit selling or disclosing the acquired data to third parties,1 75 as such behavior would affect the
information's value for other1 76 successful bidders. The agreement
will provide that the bids have to be submitted in cash with a firm
financial commitment, to ensure comparability among the bidders.
The parties will also agree to keep the amount paid in the auction
(each party pays the price of its bid) secret to the extent permitted
under the bylaws of the company. There is no value in disclosing
the amount of the winning bids. In addition, it might frustrate parties coming first in the auction to realize they paid more than the
other prevailing parties for the same thing. The identity of the winning parties might reveal information to their competitors on the
direction of their future research. The successful bidders shall also
not be informed about their ranking in the auction.
The agreement will also stipulate the number of successful bidders that will be given access to the complete application information. The disclosure shall not be limited to only one interested
party with the highest bid but should include up to the six highest
bidders, depending on the total number of interested parties as
well as the data's apparent potential for innovation. By allowing
more than one party to purchase the data, compensation for the
manufacturer will probably turn out to be higher, although the parties will consider this limit on exclusivity when determining the
data's value. This aspect of the process will provide a further incentive to develop a new product. Furthermore, the more parties try to
advance upon the disclosed research data, the higher the chances
for results that will contribute to scientific progress and innovation.
Of course, at the same time, more of the original manufacturer's
competitors will be strengthened. However, this result is justified:

175. A further restriction regarding nondisclosure towards foreign subsidiaries seems unnecessary. The possibility of using the sensitive information for markets outside the U.S. privileges companies operating globally compared to those operating locally, enabling the former
to pay more for the data. However, this aspect does not justify further limitation on the
further use of the data. Otherwise, the benefit of innovation would be limited to the U.S. In
addition, most pharmaceutical companies act globally in light of the research costs connected with the development of new drugs.
176. Regarding the number of successful bidders, see infra next paragraph.
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the public interest in innovation outweighs the manufacturer's interest in secrecy insofar as the manufacturer will receive considerable compensation from the auction that will likely approximate the
market value of its research data.

iv. Sealed bids
A further important detail is that the auction procedure will require sealed bids, allowing only the FDA to see the amounts submitted by the participants. Experiences with auctions in mergers and
acquisitions have shown that sealed bids ensure the highest
revenues.177 They are commonly seen as an approach very favorable
to the seller. 78 Among others, strategies such as collusion, bluffing,
and threats are much less likely to occur. 179 The underlying principle is that a bidder, not knowing what its competitors will offer, has
to submit the lowest possible bid that is at the same time higher
than those of the other participants. The bidder must expect that
everyone is willing to pay what the information is-or each party
thinks it is-worth. Since every participant will presumably base its
bid on these considerations, the bids will likely equal the actual
market value that the respective participants attribute to the sensitive information.
Because of the obligatory nature of the auction, it is particularly
important that the model address the obvious danger of secret
agreements among the bidders, which could lower the highest bids
considerably. Through such agreements, the bidders would circumvent the effect of sealed bids and distort the underlying objective of
the auction to determine the fair market value of the sensitive
information.
To avert this danger, severe sanctions will be imposed if such an
agreement becomes public. Like in antitrust law, which basically
deals with the same problem (market participants trying to circumvent fundamental principles of fair competition for their own benefit and to the detriment of others), the sanctions will be, in
principle, monetary. The sanctions for particularly severe or repeated violations should include exclusion of the parties in breach
177.
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from further auctions, as suggested earlier as a penalty for breaching the confidentiality agreement.18 0
In light of the difficulties inherent in proving secret agreements
between the participants, there should be a second approach to
prevent abuse of the auction process by bidders: the FDA experts
will, before the beginning of the auction, estimate the minimum
value of the sensitive information. This minimum value will assist in
identifying unrealistically low bids. It will not be disclosed to the
participants, as this, of course, could influence the bids. In case the
highest bid is below the set minimum value, the whole auction will
be terminated because of the high probability of unlawful agreements among the bidders. This precaution also serves to ensurejust
compensation for the manufacturer to prevent a possible violation
of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or the respective
takings clauses in European national constitutions. As previously explained, the sensitive information might amount to trade secrets
and could thereby constitute property in the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause." Since disclosing the information
to the winning bidders without the owner's consent might constitute a taking, the Fifth Amendment requires a public interest in the
taking as well as just compensation for the owner.
The minimum value could also eliminate, before the second
round, interested parties whose maximum nonbinding offer is below the minimum value. Although such an offer would be based
only on preliminary information, it nonetheless might indicate that
a bidder does not understand the true value of the data and therefore will not make optimal use of it from the standpoint of scientific
innovation.

v. Auction limited to manufacturers mainly operating
in the U.S. market
To further avoid potential abuse of the auction model to the detriment of the original manufacturer, the pool of potential participants in the auction shall be limited to U.S. companies and
companies realizing the majority of their revenues on the U.S. market. The same shall apply for auctions on the European level,
meaning that only European companies and those that realize the
majority of their revenues in the European market may participate.
Otherwise, it would be almost impossible to monitor and control
180.
181.
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unsuccessful bidders' compliance with their contractual obligations, particularly those regarding secrecy and the prohibition to
sell the information to third parties. Foreign companies whose primary market is the United States should be allowed to participate in
the auction. Since these parties are dependent on the U.S. market,
the FDA will review their future products, giving force to the sanction of not being allowed to take part in further auctions. Foreign
companies would also have to agree to the U.S. as the forum for any
contractual disputes.

vi. Exceptions for information substantially important to a
manufacturer's business
Although complete disclosure of sensitive information to the
highest bidders would usually be desirable, there may be cases in
which an application contains information that is substantially important to the original manufacturer's business. Disclosing such information to competitors might threaten the manufacturer's
existence, for instance, if the data indicates a special method of
conducting drug trials that permits significant savings. Sensitive information that affects the core of a manufacturer's business will
probably only rarely be included in drug approval applications. In
these cases, the manufacturer's interest in keeping such data secret
outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
Hence, the manufacturer will first indicate to the FDA which information is not to be disclosed to the public because it constitutes
confidential commercial information. Second, the manufacturer
may identify which information should not be handed over to the
successful bidders. The manufacturer must explain why disclosing
this information to competitors threatens the existence of its business. The mere fact that a disclosure may impact the manufacturer's business interests is not sufficient. The FDA will decide
whether to exclude the respective information from disclosure.
Should the FDA disagree with the manufacturer, it may approach a
competent court to rule on the permissibility of disclosure in an
interlocutory proceeding.
This exception concerning information of substantial importance for the manufacturer's business is important to strike a fair
balance between manufacturers' interest in secrecy and the public
interest in disclosure.
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2. Ensuring Impartial Review of the FDA Approval Process
The suggested model promotes enhanced review of the integrity
and quality of research data disclosed by manufacturers at least regarding the parts intended for further use, as they will verify the
data before using it for development of their products-if nothing
else, to avoid liability. Sometimes, the auction winners might also
review other parts of the FDA's work to find possible misconduct by
the agency that allows them to challenge the approval and thereby
weaken their competitors. However, this motive only applies as long
as challenging the approval would not impair the research data
they plan to use themselves and have already paid for (giving them
a clear commercial interest in the data). Hence, the manufacturers
are not suited to ensure impartial review of the FDA approval process. Hence, there remains a need for independent experts to conduct the review. This section outlines a rough framework for
independent review, which NGOs, for example, might use to prove
the existence of irregularities in the FDA's work. Of course, this
framework has to consider the importance of secrecy for incentiviz18 2
ing scientific progress.
The FDA should be obligated to disclose research data upon the
request of a person who meets the following criteria: First, that person must dispose of the scientific knowledge, and have the financial
means to conduct a thorough and useful review, according to scientific standards. But the applied standard should not be unreasonably high. Second, the person cannot be an employee of or
otherwise acquainted with any pharmaceutical company. Otherwise, the person's objectivity would be compromised. Third, the
person must sign strict confidentiality agreements prohibiting any
disclosure of information gained in connection with the review proceeding except, of course, if the information is necessary to prove
the existence of irregularities. Fourth, the inquirer must promise
not to use the insights gained through the review proceeding in any
way, including for personal research, until the corresponding data
are publicly available. One might also require the person to refrain
from developing a medicinal product in a related field. Despite the
last two restrictions, a risk for unauthorized disclosure remains, especially since a breach will often be hard to prove.18 3
Although this proceeding cannot guarantee absolute secrecy, it
constitutes a compromise between the manufacturers' interest in
secrecy and the public interest in disclosure, as well as the interest a
182.
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competitor might have in independent monitoring of the FDA's
work.
To allow for a subsequent review of the FDA's work and to make
trial data available for the scientific community, complete application data should be disclosed after an extended period of time. Ten
years might be adequate to not adversely affect the manufacturer's
and the buyers' interests. As a safeguard, the exception for information of substantial importance for the manufacturer's or the buyers'
1 4
business, as suggested above, should apply at this stage as well.

3. Access for Independent or State-Funded Scientists
So far, the auction model has not offered a means to improve
independent scientists' access to the drug application data. Naturally, this group cannot compete with private companies in the auction process. Granting this group access would significantly reduce
research costs and allow independent and state-funded scientists to
further advance scientific progress. 185 In contrast to pharmaceutical
companies, 86 independent and state-funded scientists are not focused on generating revenues. Often, their objective lies in researching less explored, less profitable areas, including diseases
that are rare or that primarily affect people who cannot afford expensive treatment. This is not to say that such research is always
unprofitable or will never be performed by drug companies. However, independent and state-funded research, for example in universities or hospitals, constitutes an integral part of scientific
progress and can supplement the pharmaceutical industry's efforts.
A general disclosure to independent researchers would undermine the manufacturer's incentive for investing in research, given
that confidentiality among third parties cannot be ensured. Thus, it
does not constitute a viable option. As a compromise, one could
amend the auction model in two ways. First, the manufacturer
could voluntarily hand over the data for free to certain groups of
scientists. These groups would not be allowed to publish or otherwise disclose results of their research that could affect the manufacturer's or the buyers' commercial interests. In the case of research
in areas in which a private company is not interested-and which
therefore does not implicate its interests-disclosure could even be
184.

See supra Part II.F.3.c.
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See supra Part II.A.2.c.
See Pogge, supra note 137, at 185-86.
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made mandatory. Second, sensitive data could be disclosed to independent researchers only after a certain period of time, allowing
pharmaceutical companies to secure their market position. In both
cases, arrangements with independent or state-funded scientists
should include confidentiality agreements to prevent unauthorized
disclosure. As the first option appears to have an earlier and therefore likely greater impact on advancing scientific progress, it seems
preferable over the second option. Admittedly, the latter provides
more protection for the pharmaceutical companies and should in
any case be implemented, to ensure incentives for investment in
research are preserved.

4. More Efficient Use of Drugs
The auction model does not achieve more efficient and appropriate use of medications. 8 7 However, it seems impossible to grant
the public more detailed access to the sensitive data included in the
drug application process without jeopardizing the manufacturers'
incentives for investments in research and development. This limitation is acceptable, because practitioners and patients can usually
become quite well informed via material currently disclosed with
regard to medicinal products, particularly the package leaflets that
accompany prescriptions. In addition, the trial data, because of its
technical content, probably will seldom contain useful insights for
lay people. Hence, this aspect of the public interest seems easiest to
neglect.

CONCLUSION

An auction model would more efficiently balance the private interest in secrecy against the public interest in disclosure of sensitive
information contained in drug application documentation. Manufacturers in the U.S. and in Europe should be compelled to disclose
the complete documentation required for the drug-approval process (subject to the exceptions mentioned) in auctions supervised
by the FDA/EMA. This procedure is in the best interest of scientific
progress and superior to the current system for protecting such information in the United States and Europe. Fairly compensating
the original manufacturer for sharing its research data with those
who can use it to contribute to scientific progress overcomes the
187.

See supra Part II.A.2.b.
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problem of reducing a manufacturer's incentive to invest in scientific research. Experience with auctions in mergers and acquisitions
demonstrates that such an approach can be applied in practice and
leads to fair results.

